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ABSTRACT 
This paper looks at the problem of optimally allocating advertising 
funds from a game theory point of view.   Two basic models are presented 
and then expanded upon.    These models are simply structured having 
originated from work done on the Colonel Blotto Game in the early 1950's, 
A prime objective of this paper Is to briefly review representative 
examples of work previously done In this area and Indicate the pos- 
sible direction of future research.   One of the more Interesting 
extensions of the basic model Is the development of a relation between 
the amount of money spent on advertising and profit. 
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I.    INTRODUCTION 
It Is a recognized fact In the business community that advertising 
Is a powerful tool In the area of product marketing.   Companies spend 
large sums of money annually In an effort to procure the patronage of 
various segments of the population.   The advertising staff Is a vital 
unit of most large companiesi without such a staff It would be dif- 
ficult to survive In the highly competitive environment of today's 
business world.   A manager who Is able to establish a successful pro- 
gram of advertising Is well rewarded.   However, should a manager be 
unable to develop and maintain an advertising program which Is at least 
as effective as his competitors' he may find his business career cut 
short.   But even considering the Importance of advertising, the majority 
of executlveswho work In the field of advertising often rely on past 
experience and knowledge of the market as a basis for their recommenda- 
tions and decisions affecting the allocation of advertising funds.   Of 
course these executives back up their experience with extensive market 
research.   A brief examination of past history shows that this method 
of deciding upon the quantity of money to be spent on advertising has 
many times been most successful.   However it would seem possible that 
some purely analytic, and somewhat less subjective, techniques could 
be applied to the problem of optimally allocating advertising ex- 
penditures.   One suggested approach Is Game Theory. 
It is the purpose of this paper to examine possible applications 
of certain game theory models to the problem of optimally allocating 
advertising funds.    It is not feasible in this paper to cover all 
possible applications of Game Theory to problems of advertising, rather 
it Is hoped that a broad overview of such applications can be presented 
so as to act as a basis for future work In this area. 
The specific results of the models presented In this paper are 
probably more applicable to national advertising as done by large 
corporations rather than that advertising done by small businesses on 
a local level. However the structure of the models Is probably ap- 
plicable In all cases. 
It Is assumed that readers of this paper will have a background 
In mathematics and hopefully be acquainted with Game Theory. As an 
aid to those readers who are not familiar with Game Theory, the fol- 
lowing section of this paper has been devoted to a summary of some 
of the more Important definitions and concepts associated with this 
branch of mathematics. This summary should not be considered to be 
complete, therefore the reader should be prepared to consult the 
references listed In the bibliography. 
II.    NATURE OF GAME THEORY 
The Theory of Games, perhaps more correctly called the Theory of 
Games of Strategy» may be described as a mathematical theory of decision 
making by participants In a competitive environment.   In a typical prob- 
lem to which this theory Is applicable, each participant can bring some 
Influence to bear upon the outcome of a certain event.   No single com- 
petitor by himself, nor chance alone, can determine the outcome of the 
conflict situation completely.   The Theory of Games of Strategy Is then 
concerned with the problems of choosing an optimal course of action which 
takes Into account the possible actions of the various participants, 
along with certain chance occurrences. 
Some examples of games of strategy are poker, chess, bridge, and 
price competition between two sellers.    It Is to be remembered that 
games of strategy allow the players to make use of their Ingenuity 
In order to Influence the final outcome of the conflict situation 
established by the "game."   Note that several of the examples of games 
of strategy given above involve the element of chance, for example 
poker (and most other card games), but none the less in each case 
the participants in these games are allowed, under the rules of the 
game, to make certain decisions which are completely indepdendent of 
chance.    Games which depend completely on chance and which do not 
allow the participants an opportunity to exercise any influence, 
such as roulette or dice, are not considered in the Theory of Games 
of Strategy.    The mathematical theory of probability was developed 
for the study of games of the type just described - games of 
chance. 
•. . < 
Although strategic situations have long been observed and recorded, 
the first attempt to abstract them into a mathematical theory of strat- 
egy was made by Emile Borel in 1921. The theory was firmly established 
in 1928 by Von Neumann when he proved the Minimax Theorem, the funda- 
mental theorem of the Theory of Games of Strategy. This theorem is 
basic because it states that optimal solutions exist for all situations 
appropriate to Game Theory. 
Before proceeding further It is necessary to present a few defi- 
nitions and concepts for those unfamiliar with Game Theory. 
First of all, a game of strategy is described by its set of 
rules.    The rules specify what each participant, called a player. 
Is allowed, or required, to do under all possible circumstances. 
Further, rules detprmlne the amount of information, if any, each 
player receives.    If the game Involves the use of chance devices, 
or If chance occurrences are an Integral part of the situation es- 
tablishing the game, the rules specify how the chance events shall 
be Interpreted.    Finally, the rules define when the game ends, the 
amount each player pays or receives, and the objective of each 
player. 
A game of strategy, from here on referred to simply as games, 
may be either finite or infinite.    A game Is finite if each player 
has a finite number of actions open to him at each play of the 
game.   Similarly, a game Is infinite If each player has an infinite 
number of actions available to him at each play of the game. 
In addition to being classified as either finite or Infinite, 
a game Is classified according to the number of players participa- 
ting In the game.   Many games Involve only two players, and 
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these are naturally called Two-person Games. Games 1n which more 
than two parties take part are customarily called IMerson Games, 
N - 3, 4. 5  
Throughout the above discussion It has been Implied, but never 
stated, that certain units, such as dollars, are exchanged between the 
players of a game.    If the loss of one player, or group of players, 
equals the winnings of the remaining player, or group of players, then 
the game 1s said to be Zero-sum.   When It Is said that the winnings 
and losses are equal It Is meant that they are equal In the sense of 
utility.    If the total sum of gains and losses Is not zero then the 
game 1s said to be Non-Zero-sum. 
To simplify the description of a game the concept of a strategy 
Is now Introduced.    Each player develops. In advance of a play of the 
game, a plan for playing the game from beginning to end.    This plan 
must be complete and cover all possible contingencies which may arise 
during a play of the game.   The plan would make use of any Information 
which may become available to the player In accordance with the rules 
of the game.    Such a complete plan for a play of a game by a player 
Is called a strategy for that player.    Please note that a player's 
plan of action, his strategy, Is complete and ready to use before the 
commencement of the game. 
A strategy which guarantees a player the best he can expect re- 
gardless of what the other players do 1s called an optimal strategy. 
The expression "a play of the game" has been used several times 
already In this paper.    However, the exact nature of a play of the 
game may or may not be apparent.    In the Theory of Games the choosing 
of a particular strategy by each player, along with the exchange of pay- 
offs which possibly result, is defined as a play of the game. 
The value of the game is the expected payoff transferred between 
the players when each player employs his optimal strategy. 
Usually the opposing players are placed into one of two catagories, 
either maximizing or minimizing.    In an unfair game, a game in which 
the value is iotne number greater than zero, the maximizing player, or 
group of players, will realize a positive expectation.   Therefore, 
the maximizing player will select an optimal strategy so as to max- 
imize his winnings.   On the other hand in an unfair game the minimiz- 
ing player,   or groups of players, will expect to lose the value of 
the game.    Therefore, the minimizing player will choose an optimal 
strategy in order to minimize his losses.   Of course if the value of 
the game is negative, then the minimizing player will have negative 
expected losses and the maximizing player will have negative expected 
winnings.    In this case the maximizing player will continue to select 
strategies which will maximize his expected winnings.   But since his 
expected winnings are negative, in this case, he is in effect mini- 
mizing his losses.    Likewise the minimizing player will continue to 
choose strategies which will minimize his expected losses.    But 
since his expected losses are negative he is actually maximizing 
his winnings.    In either case, and also in the case of a fair game, 
one in which the value of the game is zero, all players select 
strategies which will maximize their Individual utilities. 
Finally, the solution of a game is an optimal strategy for each 
player and a real number which represents the value of the game. 
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III. BASIC ALLOCATION MODELS 
One of the main objectives of the various companies comprising an 
Industry is to obtain as large a portion of the potential sales market 
as possible.    Obviously they will In general attempt to attain this 
goal through the use of advertising.    Since a given quantity, and 
quality, of advertising costs some specific amount of money, the 
companies will find their advertising programs constrained by the 
amount of available funds.    Because the amount of money available 
for advertising Is limited, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
various competitors will attempt to tailor their advertising programs 
so as to take the maximum advantage of one another's advertising 
errors.   These errors being mistakes in the allocation of advertising 
expenditures. 
A conflict situation has now been described in which the parti- 
cipants are able to Influence the outcome by selecting various al- 
locations of advertising expenditures.    Each of the competing com- 
panies must make a decision as to how much money to invest in 
advertising, their objective being to capture as large a portion of 
the sales market as possible.   The conditions necessary to examine 
the problem of optimal allocation of advertising expenditures along 
the lines of Game Theory have now been established. 
A noteworthy attempt at modeling the problem of optimal al- 
location of advertising expenditures as a problem in Game Theory 
was made by Lawrence Friedman in an article published in the 
Journal of the Operations Research Society of America in 1958. 
In this article Friedman presented five game theory -odels, two 
11 
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of which were of special interest.    These two models have been combined, 
with a few slight alterations, and are presented below as one model, 
which I shall call Model I. 
A.    MODEL I 
1.    Problem 
Assume that Companies A and B have control of an industry. 
Each of the two companies is trying to obtain business from a finite 
number of potential customers.    Both Company A and B have a fixed 
advertising budget, X and Y respectively, that must be allocated 
among the various potential customers.    It is assumed that each cus- 
tomer's business, s^, will go completely to the company directing 
the most advertising and promotion in his direction.    Find an op- 
timal advertising expenditure strategy for Companies A and B. 
Let N = Total number potential customers. 
Each customer, i, represents an amount of business s^, where 
i= 1, 2, 3,....N 
£,*<£•       ■ S, where S represents the total sales potential. 
tj       = Amount of advertising expenditures allocated by 
Company A to customer i. 
x*      = Amount of advertising expenditures allocated by 
*J       Company B to customer i. 
For convenience, from this point on     Z ^.Jy 
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The structure of the stated problem allows for the construction 
of the following pay off table: 
Result of Advertising 
Expenditure Allocation A's Payoff B's Payoff 
*; >^ 0 
% < •*> 0 -4U 
X. r <tJ *-* *-v 
TABLE I 
Since both Company A and Company 8 are trying to secure as 
large a portion of the potential sales market as possible, the dif- 
ference between the two companies' sales has been chosen as the 
objective function. Further, Company A Is assumed to be the maxi- 
mizing player and Company B 1s assumed to be the minimizing player. 
Therefore 1f we define D, the difference between A's and B's sales, 
tobe     D=   Is*t "fitj'+tfj)  ,    VHC**       I* iS 
A will select a strategy to maximize D and B will select a strategy 
to minimize D. 
The problem has now been formulated as a zero-sum, two- 
person game.    The formulation of this game Is Identical to that of 
the well known Colonel Blotto Game. 
In order to thoroughly examine the game we have developed. 
It Is necessary to Inspect two cases.    In the first case both Com- 
pany A and Company B have Identical advertising budgets.    And In 
the second case one of the two companies has a larger advertising 
budget than his conpetltor. Here we will assume that Coapany A's 
advertising budget Is larger than Coapany B's. In summary: 
Case I: Both companies have the same advertising 
budget: X-Y 
Case II: Company A has a larger advertising budget than 
Company B: X>Y 
For ease of presentation we will first assume a solution for both 
cases and then show that the assumed solution In each case Is optimal. 
2. Case I; X-Y 
This case, where X«Y, has the property of symmetry.    It cor- 
responds very closely to the symmetric case of the Colonel Blotto 
Game. 
The solution to this case lies in a mixed strategy for each 
of the two players, and the mixed strategies used by each player are 
identical.    Note that a new term, mixed strategy, has been introduced. 
It has already been explained that in a game situation the players 
have a number of alternative actions available to them.    In some 
cases a player would find that a pure strategy was his optimal 
strategy, which means he would follow the same course of action at 
each play of the game.   On the other hand if a player's optimal 
strategy is a mixed strategy, then he chooses different courses of 
action at each play of the game.   The player's choice of action 
would be determined by a probability distribution over his possible 
courses of action. 
We now continue the description of Lawrence Friedman's model. 
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Tht solution for A. which Is Identical to the solution for B. 
Is as follows: 
Co«p«ny A selects en allocation for the Jth custoaer with 




*? 2^X %' 
FIGURE I 
This solution may be described easily In geometric terms. 
When described In this manner, a simple algorithm which may be used 
to determine both company's optimal strategy, results. 
The geometric description and algorithm are now presented. 
(1)    Form a non-degenerate polygon the sides of which are pro- 
portioned In length to   -<.,, -*,.,     j -4^ 
THAT i,       *)lM :.••;-«„ = JrA — 'Jn 
If. a non-degenerate polygon cannot be formed, that Is If 
.TAi* £-~4'*'   <-f;v,       . then all funds are allocated to.**... . 
(2) Inscribe a circle In the polygon and erect a hemisphere 
upon the circle. 
(3) A point Is selected at random from a density uniformly dis- 
tributed over the surface of the Hemisphere.   This point, P, 
Is then projected straight down on to the plane of the polygon. 
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(4) The available funds are then divided In proportion to the tri- 
angular areas, a • , subtended by P and the sides of the polygon: 
(5) This Is a mixed strategy since P, which determines the alloca- 
tions. Is selected at random from a probability density, In this 




4 ■. ■*, 
FIGURE II 
3. Case II: X>Y 
This case, where X>Y, unlike Case I, is n on-symmetric. 
It also corresponds to a case of the Colonel Blotto Game, the non- 
symmetric case. 
a. Solution for Company A: Allocate an amount^- to 
customer^ chosen at random from a rectangular distribution on 
the interval (o.-^ALiL). This is identical to the strategy em- 
o 
ployed by both A and B in Case I. 
b. Solution for Company B:   Since B has less money to 
spend on advertising than A has, B cannot allocate advertising 
funds to each potential customer, because if he did. Company A, 
with the greater amount of available advertising funds, would be 
able to match B's efforts and if A, in addition to matching B's 
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efforts, allocates an additional amount £ ,€>0 . to each potential 
customer, then A Mill obtain all of the potential sales.   Obviously 
this would not be In B's best Interest.    In this situation B should 
use a mixed strategy, which would assign a probability of X of 
advertising to any given customer.   The probability that B does not 
advertise to a given customer Is then (\ ~ X).   To those customers 
to whom B does decide to allocate advertising funds, B allocates an 
amount >u: at random from the Interval (O.ÜdbLJL). (Note:   B varies 
his strategy as to which customers he will allocate advertising funds, 
but to those customers to whom he does advertise, he uses the same 
allocating strategy as A.)   The value of the game In both Case I and 
Case II Is 0 ■ S (I - J^   ), where In the symmetric case. Case I, D-0. 
4.   Proof. 
Now that solutions have been assumed for each case It Is 
necessary to show that these solutions are optimal. 
a.   Case I 
ytytyi - prob (of an allocation to a given 
customer Is between^, and 
4;+^*; optimal strategy used.) 
V (*j)   ■ prob (the allocation to a given cus- 
tomer <^ ) 
To show that the strategy given as a solution to Case I Is optimal. 
It Is necessary to show that the expected gain for A, G(Y), which 
Is a function of Y, Is always^O .     Y Is the vector of all possible 
strategies, which the opponent Is allowed to employ.    Now:   The 
expected contribution to the difference In sales from customer 1 
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using the strategy having cumulative density function F, (^) Is 
D,--*IC»-F;^.)3--*,F(^.) 
The customer will be "won" If -*, >>^,.    The customer will be "loss" 
If Oi,^.   Therefore the total expected gain as a function of the 
opponent's allocations Y Is: 
Let hj- Altitude of the triangle of area aj, subtended by P, (See 
Figure II.) 
„Aj Is uniformly distributed over (0,ZR ), where R= radius of the 
Inscribed circle. 
so Qj   ' H *} hj   &     «j   uniformly distributed over (0,-*/^  ) 
by definition: X»Jj?J;   ■/y,••■ ^<♦■•"•♦• ^ 
and the optimal strategy ^ 1 s   /jc, t ^: •• •", ^M» ö,: a^i • •' ^u 
It follows that #, = 0> ^ 
Therefore%• Is uniformly distributed over   (0, ^ÜSZ   ) 
I*; 
But:   £0^. » ^ Q4!1?*^^4     ^-*N«] 
Therefore^-   Is uniformly distributed over (0,3^—-  ) 
Now:     5 (^ ) = / fi ^ ^* =   '^^L1)  E^r-^'j 
o * 
Substituting the above Into the expression for CKY) we obtain: 
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Therefore    C<l) * Z^l* ' S±MJ'] 
But for Case I, X ■ Y. 
SO  THCAe#*>a€     01^)^0 
Therefore the mixed strategy having Individual distribution function 
%(*j) Is an optimal mlnlmax strategy.   The geometric approach Is 
a simple, and somewhat Intutatlve, method of selecting M   bids from 
a rectangular distribution such that    Z?*;>=^ 
b. Case II:   As shown above:     F"./4f;\= Miiifl. ZUKJI 
and     (S(l)>   Zt'Zl-j&yA 
But In this case X > Y. 
Therefore (?(V)2 L^J C» "^f] 
The optimal strategy for Company 8, the company with the smaller 
advertising budget. Is to allocate funds to the the customer with 
probability •*• . 
Therefore, GU), the expected difference In sales If Company A 
uses the strategy vector £ and Company B uses the strategy given 
above, is: £*(£) -   Zl^J £ (*j)(i)~*iO-i)Zt(4)] 
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Where   F* (*;). the cumulative distribution function for thejmal- 
location for Company B Is 
F j  ( *; )   - Mir [I. gL 0,.J 
and to G(i) • Z-^i'D1^       W"   (>, 5^_*j,,)-l] 
and finally G(X)    S  S p -^1 
This Implies that the maxlmlm solution for competitor A equals 
the mlnlmax solution for competitor B, and the value of the game, which 
here Is the difference In sales, Is: 
o.s[|-^J 
This completes the description of Mr. Friedman's game theory 
model for the determination of optimal advertising expenditure al- 
locations. 
Both Friedman's model ond the models which will be discussed 
below are extensions of the classic Colonel Blotto Game which was 
mentioned at various times in the preceeding discussion.    Since the 
Colonel Blotto Game plays such an Important role in the models exam- 
ined In this paper it would be well to present a brief description of 
that game at this point. 
The Colonel Blotto Game is seen in many forms, but most of 
these forms are basically the same.    Melvin Ores her In his book 
Games of Strategy. Theory and Applications , gives a simple, but 
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very complete, description of the basic Colonel Blotto Game and Its struc- 
ture.   Here Is Dresher's description, modified slightly In an effort to 
generalize the description. 
"Colonel Blotto and his enemy each try to occupy two posts by 
properly distributing their forces.   Let us assume that Colonel 
Blotto has X regiments and his enemy has Y regiments which are 
to be divided between the two posts.    Define the payoff to 
Colonel Blotto at each post as follows:   If Colonel Blotto 
has more regiments than the enemy at the post. Colonel Blotto 
receives the enemy's regiments plus one (the occupation of 
the post Is equivalent to capturing one regiment); If the 
enemy has more regiments than Colonel Blotto at the post, 
than Colonel Blotto at the post, then Colonel Blotto loses 
one plus his regiments at the post; If each side places the 
same number of regiments It Is a draw and each side gets 
zero.    The total payoff Is the sum of the payoffs at the two 
posts." 1 
In this description Dresher mentions only two objectives, 
obviously there could be any number of objectives which the opposing 
sides are trying to capture.    In our advertising expenditure models 
the objectives are the units of business potential customers pro- 
vide to competing companies.    If Colonel Blotto's forces, and his 
eneny's forces,arR Infinitely divisible, then the game Is said to 
be continuous.    On the other hand If the opposing forces are not 
Infinitely divisible and must be considered In discrete units, then 
* Dresher, M., Games of Strategy, Theory and Applications, Prentice- 
Hall  Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1961, Pg. 7 
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It Is said that the game is discrete.    Friedman's model is an extension 
of the discrete case of the general Colonel Blotto Game. 
The following models initially consider extensions of the con- 
tinuous case of the general Colonel Blotto Game.    It will be seen that 
the results of this analysis are generally the same as those arrived 
at by Friedman. 
5.    Criticism of Model I and Background for Model II. 
Considering Friedman's stated and implied assumptions, the 
preceeding model Is sound and provides a basis for further investi- 
gation Into the application of game theory to the problem of opti- 
mally allocating advertising expenditures.    However, in its present 
form Friedman's model is little more than an academic exercise since 
its application to the real world is limited to a few special cases. 
It is felt that Friedman's model could be Improved in three areas. 
First, Friedman's model is not as streamlined mathematically as It 
could be.    Secondly, his assumptions concerning the effectiveness 
of each company's advertising dollar is generally not valid.    And 
finally, the use of the difference in sales as an objective function, 
or measure of effectiveness, does not reflect the thinking of many 
managers in business today.    The remaining portions of this paper 
will be devoted to an attempt at rectifying the three problem areas 
just mentioned. 
Although Friedman's development provides a rather simple 
algorithm   for use in determining the actual amount of money to 
be spent on each potential customer, or group of customers, it 
seems that It is not necessary to appeal directly to analytic 
geometry to show that under his assumptions his solutions are 
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optimal.    M. P. Peisakoff, In a paper written In 1951 for the Rend Cor- 
poration, examined the general case of the Colonel Blotto Game.   By 
looking at the two-person Colonel Blotto Game In Its most general form 
Peisakoff was able to cover both the symmetric and non-syimetrlc cases 
without separating them as Friedman did.    In his paper, Peisakoff proves 
very concisely that optimal strategies do Indeed exist for both players 
In the general case of the Colonel Blotto Game.   Further the solutions 
which Peisakoff suggests are Identical to the ones which Friedman used 
as a basis for the development of his model.   This suggests that It 
Is possible to modify Peisakoff s work and apply It to the problem 
under study In this paper.   The hope here Is to present a model which 
Is less cumbersome than Friedman's, and which does not appeal directly 
to analytic geometry.    Further, where as Friedman developed his model 
based on the discrete Colonel Blotto Game, the model presented below 
Is based on the continuous, and more general, case of the Colonel 
Blotto Game. 
The following Is an advertising expenditure allocation model 
based on a modification of Peisakoff s theorem and subsequent proof. 
B.    MODEL II 
As In Model I we have to -ompanles, A end 8, both of wtiom are 
trying to obtain business fron a group of potential customers. 
Let X ■ Company A's total available advertising budget. 
Y > Company B's total available advertising budget. 
S - Total potential amount of sales. 
Company A selects a function « from the non-negative measurable 
functions on the Interval CM   such that fmo) dt ■ X,   x >o 
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"*(» ■   portion of available advertising funds allocated by 
Company A to some given potential customers or group 
of customers. 
Company B selects a function ^ from the non-negative measurable function 
o 
-J^W a   portion of available advertising funds allocated 
by Company B to some given potential customer or 
group of customers. 
It Is assumed that Company A Is the maximizing player and Company B 
is the minimizing player.    Therefore by convention. Company A re- 
ceives the "winnings."   In this model Company A receives a net gain 
over B of 
Mßl   sign [y»- £ (^^      . where   -±^1     Is 
the fraction of the total sales represented by a given customer or 
group of customers. 
[^•W-  1 |W = /        > tt)erefore   p,,^   . s 
O 
Now assume that X^ Y since the case of Y > X can be gotten by sim- 
ply Interchanging players (I.e. companies). 
1.    DeflnltlQ'. of Strategies 
A strategy for Company A is a random function //{t) which is 
Measurable on the Product Axfo, l] . 
esc   Is a random variable on the arbitrary space A. 
and      j VJ*)/*    - X for all  oc 
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Likewise a strategy for Company B Is a random function M (t) 
which Is measurable on the Product Bx [0t l] . 
4 Is a random variable on the arbitrary space B. 
and    f^Jri&^Y    fall all^. 
2. Theorew 
Suppose that for a strategy 4£,(t), for each fixed t» the random 
variable ^r(t)( is uniformly distributed on the Interval fc, X4,t*\ ^l . 
Suppose further that for a strategy«^ (t), for each fixed t» the random 
varlable^U) Is uniformly distributed    [o,**£**] with probability 
JL  , and Is zero with probability \\ -«Jfjj 
Then ^ 1s an optimal strategy for Company A and w Is an optimal 
strategy for Company B.    Further the value of the game Is Sfi -jrl 
3. Proof 
LetyM  be the measure associated with ar 
5- be the uniform distribution on fo» i±£lLXl • 
^> be fixed 
Applying Fubinl's theorem and the assumption of this model we obtain: 
Let*' (t) -  -^ ;    fiwy-/ 
1
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Now let T •  f>-|a.y^)X<^<*)|     then 
■ (X)"' / <** DlVo)* -^^>] -| 
- (x)'1 (xx-y-Jciv^x-^)]^} - / 
Since Y £ X     and X, Y 2^    then 
It has now been shown that if Company A employs strategy 
^(t) against any fixed strategy y(t) of Company B, he will be 
assured of receiving f1  x j  •    But the objective function has been 
defined as the difference between A's and B's sales.    Therefore 
the quantity fl-Jl|   is that fraction of the total potential 
sales which equals A's net gain over B,   So If A employs strategy 
^(t) he will expect to receive at least SJl-.X|  more sales than 
B. 
Therefore if strategy^ (t) 1s used 
D> 5 j •"•y- r , where D * the difference be- 
and D goes to A 
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Now:   Let the measure associated with^g be v and let f^. = ( *   )^ + 
(•"^ ) U, where U assigns probability 0 to 1.   Then given a fixed 4r(t) 
jgjfi fsw l„u) -ty*)] *'(,)£ ' 
''" [''* ('&) MAX CS,^-*'^)*-«'43 
Now let T*   - |>|A^,,^)X<«(»j| th«r 
ro,.j-T' 
Therefore If Company B uses the strategy/* (t) against any 
fixed strategy of A, then Company B can expect that A will receive 
no more than j»-y[    .   Again fi-21    Is that fraction of the 
total possible sales equivalent to the difference vetween A's and 
B's sales.   Therefore B can Insure that A will not be able to ob- 
tain greater than   Sp-yl   sales more than B.    If B employs 
strategy^ (t) 
D i  SJ1*?}   » where D ■ difference between A's and B's 
1
    *) sales 
and D goes to A. 
?7 
In summary: 
G {*(*)> yi*)   )   s Payoff function, objective function 
0({t)   -Any possible strategies employed by Company A 
^(t) ■ Company A's optimal strategy 
•£i(t)   ■ Any possible strategy employed by Company B. 
^ (t) ■ Company B's optimal strategy. 
I'-^J 
The advertising allocation model Just described is obviously more 
streamlined and general than Friedman's, and it arrives at the same 
results as did Friedman's model.   The most important of these re- 
sults perhaps being that given two Companies A and B, with total 
advertising budget X and Y respectively, and X>Y. the difference, 






 f'' x t • where s 1s the total potential sales. 
However this second model lacks a simple means of determlng exactly 
how to distribute Company A's and Company B's advertising budgets. 
Friedman's model on the other hand provides an easily followed 
algorithm which can be used to decide how much of the advertising 
budget to allocate to a customer, or group of customers. 
But this possibly is not too Important, since management is more 
often Interested in the total expected results of an advertising 
campaign costing Z number of dollars.   That is, the management of 
28 
large companies, for example Sears Roebuck, General Motors, Goodyear 
and Dupont, feel that through market research they can determine how 
to spend their advertising money.   What they want to know Is how much 
money to spend and given a specific amount of money to spend, what 
can they expect to receive back In terms of sales.   Both Friedman's 
model and the model Just presented based on Pelsakoff's work can help 
to answer these questions.   Perhaps from a strictly mathematical 
point of view the second model Is more appealing, since It Is first 
very general, and second, less cluttered than the first. 
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IV.    RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF ADVERTISING DOLLARS 
A.    DISCUSSION 
Models can be useful for two purposes, first to predict the outcome 
of the real world events they represent and second to establish a firm 
structure for the operation under consideration.    A model may at the 
same time be able to do one of these and not the other.   The two 
models presented so for are an example of this, as seen In the fol- 
lowing discussion. 
The models do provide some Interesting points concerning the struc- 
ture of the problem.    They tell us that In general optimal pure strat- 
egies do not exist.    For the case of a small company In competition 
with a larger one, the models say that the smaller company should dis- 
regard at random certain portions of the potential market and meet the 
competition on equal terms In the remaining portions of the market. 
Of course If the optimal mixed strategies are to be Indeed optimal 
in the real world then It Is necessary that management keep their 
allocation decisions secret until they actually activate their ad- 
vertising programs. 
It should be obvious from the above discussion that by Just 
merely setting up our models we can gain Insight Into the operation 
under study.   Now for the question of whether or not Model«; I and II 
are of any use In predicting the outcome of real world events.    First 
of all It should be noted that It Is not necessary that models be 
absolutely accirate In their predictions, but It Is necessary that 
their predictions agree closely enough with reality so as not to 
cause false decisions to be made by those persons employing the models. 
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From this point of view both of the preceeding models. In their present 
forms; are unacceptable.    The validity of the predictions made by models 
Is highly dependent on the validity of the various assumptions upon 
which the models are built.    If these assumptions are not valid, then 
It Is highly unlikely that the models under study will be able to give 
meaningful answers to real world problems. 
Throughout the development of both Friedman's model and the se-ond 
model based on Pelsokoff's work, It was assumed that each dollar spent 
on advertising by one company was as effective as each dollar spent on 
advertising by the second company.    Another way of stating this Is that 
It was assumed that the amount of business which one company's adver- 
tising dollar could buy was equal to the amount of business that the 
other company's advertising dollar could buy.    However, It Is quite 
easy to find real world examples which show that this assumption Is 
completely invalid.    Because this assumption Is not valid the use of 
the equations given in the models to determine the difference between 
the companies' sales may result in very erroneous calculations, as 
shown in the examples below. 
Ali of the data in the following examples has been taken from 
the 26 August 1968 issue of Advertising Age am   this data is for 
the year 1967. 
1.    Example 1 
In this example we shall look at General Electric and Radio 
Corporation of America.    These two companies account for greater than 
seventy-five percent of the total sales of domestically produced ap- 







GE 7.8 X 107 7.7 X 109 
RCA 7.5 X 107 3,0 X 109 
Sum of G.E.'s 
and RCA's sales 10.7 X lO* 
TABLE II 
Let D   •   difference In the sales based on actual figures 
a
    (G.E.'s sales)   -    (RCA's sales) 
O' =   4.7 X lo'* dollars 
But according to the equation developed In the two models presented 
In this paper: 
D   ■   Calculated difference In sales between two companies 
Ml where X = G E. advertising ex- penditures 
=   10.7 X 1( ex- l0<i
  f1 *   7-5 X 10^ )      Y = RCA advertising 
I 7,8 X 10M penditures 
=    10.7 X 10^  jl -   0.962] S - Total sales In dollars 
=    10.7 X 10^ {,038] = r.0380 X lO^ 
D     »    3.80 X 107 
Therefore D / P7 
l/  -    D>1 X ]0Z 
The difference between the actual and calculated results, i.e. D1- D 
Is obviously too great to be Ignored.    It Is obvious in this example 
that General Electrlc's advertising dollar was much more effective. 
In terns of dollars of sales per dollar of advertising, than Radio 
Corporation of America's advertising dollar. 
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2. Example 2 
In order to show that the preceedfng example fs not a unique 
situation, the case of Eastman Kodak vs. Polaroid Corporation will be 
examined. These two companies control greater than ninenty nercent 




Total Sales of 
Each Company 
On 5) 
Kodak 4.9 X 107 1.7 X 10f 
Polaroid 2.1 X 107 0.37 X 10^ 
Total 
Sales, 
2.07 X lO*' 
TABLE III 
Let D   •   difference in sales based on actual figures 
-   (Kodak's sales) - (Polaroid's sales) 
D'»     1.33 X 10^ dollars 
But according to the equation developed in the two models: 
D ■     calculated difference in sales 
■     s|/-J^|        ,   w/iere        X = Kodak's advertising funds 
D'-D 
y ■ Polaroid's advertising funds 
2.07 X 10 Ml -   2.1 X loM 
I        4.9 X TÜM 
2.07 X 101 fl - 0.428] 
2.07 X 10  / 0.572 j     = 
1.18 X 109 
1.5 X 108 dollars 
S = Total sales 
(all the above in dollars) 
1.18 X 10** 
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■ 
Again the estimated and actual  value of D differ by a noticeable 
amount.    It appears, in this example that Kodak's advertising dollar is 
more effective than Polaroid's 
B.    RELATIVE ADVERTISING EFFECTIVENESS OF DOLLARS 
If the models discussed in this paper are to be of any use it is 
necessary to take into account the relative effectiveness of the ad- 
vertising dollars of the companies involved.    Again take the case of 
General Electric and Radio Corporation of America.    For every dollar 
spent by G. E. on advertising approximately 100 dollars in sales 
were realized.    But for every dollar spent by RCA on advertising 
only 40 dollars in sales were returned.    In other words each of G.E.'s 
advertising dollars returned 2.5 times the quantity of sales that each 
advertising dollar of RCA's did. 
When it is said that Company A's advertising dollar is more ef- 
fective than Company B's, it is necessary to understand exactly what 
is meant by advertising effectiveness, and why one company's adver- 
tising dollar is more effective than another company's. 
In answer to the first question it might be more proper to talk 
of relative advertising effectiveness.    If we let the number of dol- 
lars of sales per dollar of advertising be a measure of the advertising 
effectiveness of each company's advertising dollar, then the ratio of 
two companies' dollar advertising effectiveness will result in the 





Let A ■ CMpeny A's total salts In dollars 
B ■ Company B's total salts In dollars 
X ■ Company A's advertising budget 
Y - Conpany B's advertising budget 
j    '   Advertising effectiveness of Company A's adver- 
tising dollar 
Y    - Advertising effectiveness of Company B's 
advertising dollar 
then: —£  ■ Relative advertising effectiveness 
If V^A 
then (fR *  £B 
1. Acceptance 
It is fairly easy to answer the question of why one company's 
advertising dollar is more effective than another company's adver- 
tising dollar.   This answer is in two parts.    First of all the concept 
of acceptance is extremely important.    This concept seems not to have 
a specific definition, but a good synonym would be reputation.   A 
company which has a good reputation does not need to spend as much 
money on advertising to attain a given quantity of sales as it would 
If its reputation was not as good.   Reputation is built on the qual- 
ity of a company's products and services.    If a company produces 
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high-quality goods and/or supplier effective and effic*ent services 
then it can be assured of a good 'eputation     Reputation, or acceptance 
as certain executives prefer, is a source of "free" advertising, which 
•ay or My not be good.    "Free" advertising consists mainly of reviews 
of a company's products and services found in various publications, 
and word of mouth, that is a satisfied customer, or a dissatisfied 
customer, expressing his opinion of a company to another potential 
customer     Obviously if the reviews are good and the customers are 
satisfied, then a company needs to spend lf*^s money to convince po- 
tential customers to purchase that company s products and/or services. 
On the other hand if the reviews are not good and customers are un- 
happy with the company's products and/or services, then the company 
is forced to spend additional money in an attempt to overcome the 
ill effects of this unfavorable "free advertising "   The effects 
of reputation or acceptance are so strong that many companies find 
it to their financial advantage to spend extra money on quality con- 
trol in order to build a good reputation 
The concept of acceptance also takes into account the length 
of time a company has been in existence     The longer a company has 
been established, the less effort it takes to make the public aware 
of its presence     This effort is reflected in the amount of adver- 
tising done by the company     A ne* company in an industry, unlike 
one of the older, well-established ones, must spend a good deal of 
money on advertising just to get their name in the minds of potential 
customers.    It is possible that a large percentage of this initial 
advertising effort by young companies is unproductive.    Unproductive 
in the sense that   M   dollars spent by young companies on advertising 
results In a lesser amount of sales than an older company would 
realize with an equal expenditure of funds for advertising.    Customers 
often tend to be conservative in their buying habits and feel more com- 
fortable dealing with an older, better known company.    Once a company 
has been accepted as an established element of an industry, then it 
does not need to spend a great deal of money on advertising just to 
let customers know that it is around.    At this point the company can 
now divert its advertising effort to specific areas of merchandise. 
2.    Non-optimal Strategies 
The second part of the answer as to why one company's ad- 
vertising dollar is apparently more effective than another company's 
nay lie in the selection of advertising strategies.    If the companies 
Involved In the conflict situation as outlined in this paper do not 
pick optimal strategies, then the value of the game, 0 ■ S f1'^] 
will not be realized.    If one company selects an optimal, or near 
optimal strategy and the other company selects a non-optimal strategy, 
then it will appear that the company employing the optimal strategy 
has the more effective advertising dollar.    The company using an 
optimal advertising strategy will In fact possess advertising dol- 
lars which are relatively more effective than the company not em- 
ploying an optimal strategy, since according to the Theory of Games, 
players in a game situation cannot maximwe their utility by using 
non-optiml strategies. 
In mathematical symbols the above can be stated more clearly 
as follows: 
Recall  from the development of the advertising model based 
on Plesakoff's work that: 
3/ 
^((t) = Any possible strategy employed by Company A 
Ot^it) * Company A's optimal strategy 
^»(t) = Any possible strategy employed by Company B 
-y  (t) = Company B's optimal strategy 
D = Value of game. 
X(*) 1        ' objective functions, when opti- 
' mal strategies employed equals 
value of game- 
If A uses an optimal strategy, but B does not, the value of the ob- 
jective function is greater than the value of the game.    i.e.    If 
the value of the game is D = s)' '•y {   t,ien ^ D 1S the value of the 
objective function given A uses an optimal strategy and B does not, 
we obtain      i[|-Y! = D<P/ 
On the other hand if B uses an optimal strategy and A does not, then 
the valu   of the objective function, D , is less than the value of 
the game,   i.e. 
D 
In the example of General Electric versus Radio Corporation 
of America it was noted that   ^(l'-yl     ; D <  D   and it was said 
that General Electric's advertising dollars appeared relatively 
more effective than R.C A.'s     We can conclude that since  SJt-Xl-D AUD 
J><D'« RCA, the company replacing Company B in the model, is not em- 
ploying an optimal advertising strategy.    Even if RCA, in this 
example, is distributing its advertising effort, based on the 
absolute value of the advertising funds available, in an optimal 
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manner, it Is possible that the relative effectivenesss of RCA's ad- 
vertising dollar has been degraded by a lack of "acceptance."   Therefore, 
even though   Y   dollars are available in absolute terms, these   Y   dol- 
lars may be only as effective as^AV dollars,oiji/   , as a result of the 
influence of "acceptance."    In general   -S ['" 7 / ^ ^ ['''   *  1 . 
this is another very likely source of error in the calculation of D. 
We have seen that the effectiveness of a company's advertising 
dollar may be degraded by an improper choice of advertising strategies 
and/or by the ill effects of that somewhat abstract factor called 
acceptance.    It may also be degraded by a lack of secracy.    If a 
given company can find out in advance exactly how his competitors are 
going to allocate their funds, then It is possible to adjust his ad- 
vertising program to take full advantage of this knowledge.    It Is 
therefore essential, especially for a company with a small advertising 
budget, to keep all allocation schemes secret until they have been 
put into effect. 
Assuming secracy , it is now necessary to specify a method by 
which our models may be used in order to be able to predict, with 
some accuracy, the outcome of real world events.    For now the real 
world events of interest will be the difference in sales between 
two companies given the companies' advertising budgets. 
C.    MODIFICATIONS OF MODELS I AND II TO ALLOW FOR THE RELATIVE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF ADVERTISING DOLLARS 
Obviously it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
to separate and quantitize the effect of acceptance non-optimal 
strategy selection which result in incorrect calculations of the 
value of D for a given pair of companies for a given period of time 
in a real world situation.    If it were possiMe to determine 
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exactly which non-optimal strategy a company elected to employ, then, 
with a knowledge of the effects of acceptance on the relative effective- 
ness of the company's advertising dollar, it would be possible to pre- 
dict a correct value for D.    However, considering the general case, it 
is possible to have an infinite number of non-optimal strategies to 
choose from.    The following is a suggested approach to circumvent the 
difficulties just described and to establish a method of correctly 
predicting the value of D. 
(1) The companies in question must be examined in pairs. 
(2) It is assumed that the effect of acceptance are constant in 
the short run, specifically over approximately a two year period. 
(3) It is assumed that companies do not radically alter advertising 
allocation schemes from one year to the next. 
(4) It Is assumed that for each pair of companies of interest it 
is possible to obtain the following data: 
(a) Total sales. 
(b) Total advertising expenditures. 
(This data is generally available.)    It Is further assumed that 
if this is year X, the required data is available at least up 
to year X-l    (last year). 
(5) If A   ■   Total sales in dollars for Company A 
B   =   Total sales in dollars for Company B 
X   =   Company A's total expenditures for advertising 
Y   ■   Company B's total expenditures for advertising 
A , B , X , and Y   are based on data for year X-l. 
Let o' = A'  -    Ö' 
40 
D   =   N   S 'C-fl 
N 1s a constant which takes Into account the effect of non-optimal 
strategy selections and acceptance 
N 
*'[>■*) 
H Is determined for year X-l and Is used to predict D for year X.    The 
only available Information concerning year X are estimates for X, Y, 
and S, the potential value of the market. 
{-*} D =    N S 






A 50 200 
B 30 90 
DATA FOR YEAR X-l 
TABLE IV 
S - 200 + 90    X - 50 
- 290 
O' ■ 200 - 90    Y' - 30 
■ no 





Expenditures Total Sales 
A 100 400 
B 60 180 
Let 0 
Let D 
DATA FOR YEAR X 
TABLE V 
Actual difference between A and B's sales 
400 - 180 
220 




sll~ xl • In a r«al situation S. Y. and X 
sro would most likely be estimates. N
 "  J* 
S - 400 O 80 
- 580 
Y - 60 




In summary, the preceedlng Is a methoa which uses past Information 
to predict the future difference In sales between two companies.    The 
past data Is used specifically to determine a constant M   which 
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accounts for variations from the ideal caused by non-optimal strategy 
selections on the part of the companies involved, and the effects of 
acceptance on each company's advertising dollar effectiveness.   Once 
N is determined it is used as a correction factor in the equation 
originally developed to predict the difference in sales between two 
companies.   That is 
D   -   N   Sfi-^j 
The modified equation will give accurate predictions only as long as 
assumptions (3) and (3)  mentioned above are true.    In general these 
assumptions are true only in the short run, therefore N should be 
continually updated whenever practical. 
0.    USE OF MODEL IN DETERMINATION OF TOTAL SALES EFFECT. 
1.    Profit 
So far we have dealt only with differences in sales which 
can be expected if two companies allot X and Y dollars respectively 
to advertising.   However business executives do not find this to 
be an acceptable criterion by which to Judge the effectiveness of 
their advertising efforts.    The prime concern of management Is 
profit, pure and simple. 
Most managers will sacrifice sales in favor of profit. 
Profit, for some reason, has a soothing effect on such easily 
ruffled individuals as stock holders, and member of the board of di- 
rectors. In view of this extremely strong tendency of large business 
to Judge the effectiveness of advertising by profits returned, 
It seems advisable to develop an expression which will be able to 
predict profit as a function of advertising expenditure. 
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Let  A =' Company A's sales 
X = Company A's advertising expenditure 
B ■ Company B's sales 
Y = Company B's advertising expenditures 
D = Difference between A and B's sales 
S ■ Total sales 
A + B = S     D = N S [»- -J] 
Therefore, 
B » S - A 
D - A - B - NS {»-•?) 
But B > S - A 
So A - (S - A) - NS(i-y) 
2A - S - NS{«-jf) 
2A - NS{'--J]^ 
-s|>f..*]*.] 
Therefore Company A's sales - ^ C1^ 0'^ j'1'' J 
Now   Profit - Sales (In dollars) - Cost 
Let P ■ profit 
C • costs 
The above expression gives the predicted profit for Company A. 
6's predicted profit may be found In a similar manner. 
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V.    MARKETS WITH N - COMPETITORS 
Although the models, and model modifications, presented thus far 
In this paper appear to be potentially very useful, they have one major 
flaw which up to this point has not been explicitly mentioned.    The 
general formulazatlon of the models has been along the lines of a zero- 
sum, two-person game.    That Is, It has been tacitly assumed that the 
companies Involved 1n the conflict situation previously described at- 
tribute the same value of utility to every dollar.   Specifically It has 
been assumed that each company's utility function is linear in dollars 
and identical.    It has further been assumed that the companies of 
Interest have been members of a duopoly; perhaps this last assumption 
is the most difficult to justify.    Obviously very few actual industries 
are controlled entirely by two companies.    In general an industry is 
composed of many individual companies.    Considering this situation, it 
would probably be advisable to restructure the problem of optimal ex- 
penditure allocations along the lines of an N-person game, M >^# , 
but this presents some new problem1;. 
The theory of games has not been advanced to the point of being 
able to solve the general N-person game, except for a very few special 
cases.    It has proven exceedingly difficult to establish methods for 
dealing with certain situations which can only arise when more than 
two parties are involved in a conflict.    These situations involve 
collusion on the part of two or more players.    For example. It is 
possible for certain players, if allowed by the rules of the game, 
to form alliances and then establish jointly optimal strategies. 
These jointly optimal strategies could be such that they would be 
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non-optimal if employed by any one of the colluding players.    Further the 
rules of the game could allow players to switch from one coalition to 
another between plays of the game.    The complexity of handling N-person 
games should be apparent from this brief discussion of the subject. 
Although the problem of optimally allocating advertising expenditures 
has not been analyzed as an N-person game in this paper, the models which 
have been discussed may still be useful in industries other than duopolies, 
First of all it has been stated that one of the biggest difficulties en- 
countered in N-person games, N>2, is the collusion which is possible on 
the part of the players.   However if collusion is disallowed by the rules 
of the game, then analysis of N-person games becomes considerably less 
difficult.    In the United States it is unlawful for corporations to. en- 
gage in collusion with a view towards reducing competitors.   Therefore 
it can be assumed that businesses can not, in general, form coalitions 
and fonmulate joint advertising strategies.    This implies that each com- 
pany must act independently in the area of advertising.    In view of 
these considerations the following methods are suggested for the im- 
plementation of the models discussed in this paper by companies com- 
peting in non-duopoly, or monopoly industries. 
(1) A company called A, with a given advertising budget may wish 
to estimate its sales, or profit, relative to each of its competitors 
individually.    This may be accomplished simply by equating the value 
of S, sale potential, to the estimated sales for which Company A and 
any one of its competitors together could account for.    The value 
of X and Y are as described previously.    Company A may use this 
technique for each competitor. 
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(2) A company called A, with a given advertising budget may wish to 
estimate Its sales, or profit, relative to all of Its competitors taken 
In aggregate.    Here, although there may be many Individual players. I.e. 
competitors, the game Is reduced to a two-person game where one player 
Is an Individual company. In this case A, and the other player Is a 
composite player formed by the sum of the remaining companies.    More 
simply, the two players In this game are Company A and everyone else. 
The quantity S Is the estimated total potential sales of the Industry. 
Company A has an advertising budget of X dollars.   The opposing player 
has an advertising budget of Y" dollars.    Where Y" = IfJ   , /io .   V» 
advertising budget of Company >' , (Index starts at 2 since Company A Is 
not Included)Companys Is one of A's competitors forming the composite 
player. 
Then: 
D- Ns(i--är']     ,  If /" ix 
The above two methods for dealing with Industries which are not 
duopolies may or may not give accurate predictions, and are only 
suggested methods, with any further development left to future re- 
search. 
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VI.    CONCLUSION 
An attempt has been made in this paper to present useful models, 
based on Game Theory, dealing with the problem of optimally allocating 
advertising expenditures.    If the models and relations discussed in 
this paper are applied to real world situations it is felt that the 
management of a given company will be able to accurately predict, 
over the short run, the company's sales behavior relative to any given 
competitor.    However, since many of the equations developed in this 
paper are used with estimated quantities and data from previous time 
periods, it is necessary to be aware of the possibility of inaccurate 
predictions caused by the use of poor input data.   No model is able to 
correct for poor data, unless of course the error in the data is fairly 
constant. 
It must be remembered that the problems of developing effective ad- 
vertising policies are very complicated and one must not think that 
these problems can be solved by merely substituting appropriate terms 
into a set of handy equations. 
It was not the purpose of this paper to present an absolute method 
which would solve any advertising allocation problem.    There are   many 
parts of the models presented in this paper which could be improved 
through future research.    The application of game theory to the prob- 
lem of advertising funds allocation seems to have considerable merit, 
and even the crude models presented and discussed throughout this 
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